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(IMAS), or whether such standards specific to IEDs should stand alone. We invited
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The evolving nature of humanitarian mine action—particularly in areas such as Iraq
and Syria—has generated debate as to whether new standards on improvised explo-
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sive devices (IED) should be included in current International Mine Action Standards
opinion on this subject, encourage conversation and debate, and welcome responses
to be published online and/or in print in Issue 22.1.
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Improvised Explosive Devices and the
International Mine Action Standards
by Guy Rhodes, Ph.D. [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ]

I

mprovised explosive devices (IED) are not new in mine action;
they have contributed to explosive ordnance contamination in
post-conflict settings since the advent of humanitarian demining almost 30 years ago.1,2
What is new is that the systematic deployment of IEDs by armed
groups is occurring today on a greater scale. The prevalence of use
of these weapons by highly visible groups such as the Islamic State
has accentuated the profile of IEDs even further. In addition, a large
proportion of the IEDs deployed are victim-operated (VOIED) and
contribute to a new landmine emergency characterized by a systematic production, standardization of designs, and the deployment of
hundreds of thousands of locally-manufactured landmines. These
recent developments have led to debate on how IEDs are defined in
relation to key conventions such as the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention (APMBC), on the required competency levels needed to
engage in IED disposal (IEDD) activities, and on the applicability
of the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) to provide the
framework for mine action operations concerning IEDs.
This editorial provides a historic perspective on the extent of
IEDD operations conducted by mine action actors, explains the
scope and applicability of the IMAS to address all explosive ordnance including improvised devices, and suggests amendments to
the IMAS to provide improved guidance to respond to IED contamination in a humanitarian context. 3

A Historical Perspective
Since the late 1980s, humanitarian demining in Afghanistan
has addressed VOIEDs as an integral part of mine action operations. The HALO Trust, for instance, has cleared over 1,400
IEDs in Afghanistan during this period. In Sri Lanka, the same
organization has cleared almost 74,000 locally-manufactured
landmines (over one-third of all landmines cleared by the organization in Sri Lanka), and some 1,250 more complex IEDs since
2002. In Colombia, a further 280 locally-manufactured landmines were cleared by The HALO Trust between 2013 and 2016.4
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In Iraq and Syria, during the course of the last 12 months,
MAG (Mines Advisory Group) cleared nearly 16,000 IEDs, mostly
locally-manufactured landmines, but also sizeable numbers of
radio-controlled, and command-detonated anti-vehicle devices
that were abandoned (see Figures 3 and 4). 5
Elsewhere in the world, improvised devices are addressed within
mine action programs from Africa (e.g., Angola), to Europe (e.g.,
Kosovo), and to Southeast Asia (e.g., Thailand). Few major conflicts
have occurred where improvised devices have not contributed to explosive contamination. In all these cases, the survey and clearance
of improvised devices by mine action operators were undertaken
within the framework of the IMAS. Image 2 presents examples of
the wide array of IEDs addressed by mine action operators.
Colombia is a case in point. A large portion of the territory in
Colombia is contaminated with IEDs laid by armed groups (see
Figure 1). The great majority of the IEDs are victim-operated,
locally-manufactured landmines (see Image 1), but other types of
devices including timer-initiated and command-initiated IEDs are
also present. Among further threats, there are gas cylinders used as
projectiles, as well as improvised mortars and rockets, which often
use explosives that have been prepared in an artisanal manner. In
Colombia, 11,485 victims have been recorded since 1990.6
Colombia has been guided by the IMAS in its efforts to address
this contamination. It has used them to develop a full set of National
Mine Action Standards (NMAS) as a framework to manage the national program of land release.

The Objective and Scope of the IMAS
The IMAS have been developed to provide a safety, quality, and
operational framework for mine action and to promote a common and consistent approach to the conduct of mine action operations. The IMAS provide guidance, establish principles, and—in
some cases—define international requirements and specifications.
They offer a frame of reference, which encourages managers of mine
action programs and projects to achieve and demonstrate agreed

Figure 1. Extent of mine contamination in Colombia (2017).

Image 1. An example of an improvised landmine found in Colombia.

Figure courtesy of DAICMA.

Image courtesy of The HALO Trust.

levels of effectiveness and safety. The IMAS provide a common language, and recommends the formats and rules for handling data,
which enables the accurate and timely exchange of information.7
The IMAS are not themselves standard operating procedures
(SOP). They provide a framework for NMAS, local SOPs, rules, instructions, and codes of practice—documents that provide more
details on how mine action requirements are to be achieved in a particular context.
Critically, the IMAS are framed by a humanitarian imperative
where landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) are considered first and foremost a humanitarian concern and should
be addressed from a humanitarian perspective (see Figure 2). In
this regard, the framing of standards and their application to national mine action programs ref lect the fundamental humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, equality, and humanity
so that mine action is focused on giving support to those who are
most vulnerable. 8
Mine action operations are therefore not defined by weapon type (i.e., they include improvised devices) but by the objectives they pursue (i.e., humanitarian) and by the context
in which they are conducted (i.e., one that permits respect for
humanitarian principles).
As mentioned, the engagement of mine action operators in
IEDD has, and should continue to follow, the same principles

used for humanitarian demining operations. As such, engagement
should continue to be based on a positive response to the following
four questions:
• Is the aim of the task humanitarian (as opposed to security
or military)?
• Is the environment conducive for safe and secure operations?
• Is humanitarian access possible and the device out of play
and cold?9
• Does the operator have the necessary skills and equipment to
undertake the relevant search and disposal operation?
If a threat assessment determines that an IED is still within an
active setting and no humanitarian access is possible, then it is a matter for relevant security forces to address. Furthermore, if a device is of
a complexity that requires a skillset or equipment that is not present,
then additional internal competencies must be developed, equipment purchased or specialist assistance requested. Such an approach
is not restricted to IEDs but is the same for all explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations concerning landmines and ERW.
None of this is meant to downplay the challenges associated with
responses to IEDs. However, it is important to note that adopting a
sound, risk-management approach for IEDs is similar to that for the
wide spectrum of unexploded ordnance (UXO), which can range from
simple items, such as grenades, all the way through to complex items
such as surface-to-air missiles with hypergolic, liquid-fueled systems.

What are the limitations for mine action
operators to engage with IEDs? Is this
different from other explosive devices?

Factors that Complicate the Debate on IEDs
Current debates on who should be doing what and where with
regards to IEDD, particularly in the Middle East, are testament to
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Figure 2. A schematic to illustrate the objective and scope of the IMAS. The IMAS provide a framework to guide mine action in pursuit of its
humanitarian objectives and in accordance with humanitarian principles.
Figure courtesy of GICHD.

the existence of differing perspectives on IEDs. Military, commercial, and NGO operators all have valid positions but also different
objectives and references in their work, as well as different modalities, competencies, and capabilities.
The current debate has some strong parallels with those associated with the early days of mine action when
• Issues of ownership of the topic of demining between NGOs,
commercial, and military took place.
• NGO involvement in broader EOD—in addition to demining—was questioned.
• Challenges existed in understanding requirements for a transition from a military context to a humanitarian one.
• There was a need to establish competence requirements for
humanitarian operations and associated training responses.
In all these past instances, the conclusions of the debates resulted in the increase of empowerment of mine action actors and ultimately the strengthening of the IMAS to more comprehensively
frame operations that support humanitarian objectives.
In the current debate on ownership of the IED issue, it is important to safeguard the IMAS as the principle framework for IEDD
work that is bounded by the objectives and contexts appropriate
for mine action. To optimize the effectiveness of IEDD activities,
however, collaboration between military, commercial, and NGO
operators is important at a procedural level, including appropriate
information exchange.
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Current discussions on IEDs from both a political and operational perspective are complicated by the term IED, that is not at all specific but used to describe many different devices which may have
only one thing in common—the fact that their construction is improvised or that they are locally-manufactured. The many types and
classifications of IEDs vary from simple to complex, and have been
characterized in a lexicon published by the United Nations Mine
Action Service (UNMAS).10 They include time-delayed IEDs, projected IEDs, and command IEDs, including suicide IEDs in vests
and on vehicle-borne platforms.
There is also a supposition that IEDs are all complex devices,
whereas, in reality, while they can present considerable additional
technical challenges during search and disposal operations, IEDs
can also be relatively simple and standardized in design. The
vast majority of IEDs addressed to date in Iraq and Syria exist as
locally manufactured landmines. They have been produced on a
massive scale by the Islamic State and are more readily detected and
disposed of than many industrially-manufactured landmines that
may, for instance, have a low metal content.
The rising impact of IED attacks in public places has been extensively documented by Action On Armed Violence (AOAV).11
Armed groups play an active and influential role in wars in
Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, and Yemen, and pose serious
threats to national security in Algeria, Cameroon, Chad, Egypt,
India, Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria, and Pakistan. Such IED attacks

raise the profile of IEDs as an issue of concern, but most incidents relate to car bombs
and suicide attacks that fall well outside the
parameters of mine action and the IMAS.
Such devices and circumstances should be
dealt with in separate guides and standards
for use by security forces.
Incidents involving IEDs should be unpacked to separate IED terror attacks using
command detonation from those initiated
by victims. IED operations in response to
terror attacks fall within the purview of security forces. This is a different context than
that where civilians are threatened from enduring contamination from IEDs and that
can be addressed during humanitarian operations.

Applicability of the IMAS to Address
IEDs Today
The IMAS as they stand already cover explosive ordnance of an improvised nature.
Image 2. A selection of photos of improvised devices taken from archives of humanitarian
IEDs are included in the current nomencla- operators.
ture found in the IMAS and there are at least Image courtesy of The HALO Trust.
nine specific references to IEDs within the
Mine action operators have always carried out risk assessments
existing chapters. These references do not limit the scope of coverahead of operations, however, this process has largely been implicage of the IMAS to a certain group of IEDs, such as pressure-plate
it in SOPs or has relied on the experience from field staff. Given the
IEDs, but rather are all-encompassing.12
complexity of some of the devices found in environments such as
Key terms used by the mine action sector, such as explosive ordin Iraq and Syria, there is a real need to carry out more explicit risk
nance, landmines (in particular anti-personnel landmines), ERW
assessments.15 This is reinforced by asymmetry of many conflicts,
and its components, such as UXO and abandoned explosive ordwhere large-scale battles cease but armed actors continue to exert
nance (AXO), include improvised devices within the context of the
influence and make use of explosives to disrupt and destabilize seIMAS glossary.13,14
curity. There is a requirement to systematize the evaluation of such
Explicit and implicit references to IEDs in the IMAS have alcontexts to ensure that mine action remains focused on humanilowed programs to frame operations that concern improvised
tarian objectives and aims to uphold humanitarian principles. A
devices within the existing standards. National programs in
more formalized guidance will benefit all mine action operations—
Afghanistan, Angola, Sri Lanka, and particularly Colombia are
whether in settings that exhibit IED contamination or otherwise.
testament to this.
The IMAS place a high priority on the issue of efficiency and
Notwithstanding the framework that the IMAS provide for IEDD
the importance of targeting mine action resources appropriately.
activities, there is a significant shortfall in the explicit guidance on
In rural environments, non-technical survey helps target clearance
IEDs in the IMAS. These deficiencies in the standards have become
assets at suspected (SHA) or confirmed hazardous areas (CHA)
increasingly apparent as international attention focuses on countries
based on evidence. In addition, specific training to improve evalsuch as Iraq and Syria, where the explosive contamination, particuation skills and the ability of survey teams to accurately define
ularly in areas formally under the control of the Islamic State, insuch areas is elaborated in the IMAS. Similar guidance that targets
cludes unexploded and abandoned IEDs, in urban as well as rural
the urban environment is lacking—including methodology for ursettings. In such theaters, operators have to review skill sets of their
ban assessments, such as how to assess urban structures, take into
field staff, and national authorities are under pressure to scrutinize
account rubble (including rubble contaminated by explosive ordaccreditation procedures of organizations under their responsibility.
nance), and deal with threats of IEDs hidden in residential, occuFurthermore, donors consider value for money from a wide variety
pational, and community premises.
of proposals and look to issue grants and contracts with appropriate
reference to international norms. All such actors look to the IMAS
for guidance on IEDD, currently with only limited success.
Strengthening of the IMAS
A focus on the additional guidance necessary in current contexts,
The IMAS have been designed as evolving standards that are conincluding IEDs in the urban environment, is overdue. IEDs in these
stantly reviewed and updated to ensure that they stay relevant and
contexts increase the need for the IMAS to expand on:
applicable to the changing nature of settings where mine action ac• Sound risk assessment processes.
tivities are conducted.
• Rapid and accurate surveys.
The IMAS currently fall short in the necessary guidance to ad• Safe and efficient processes for removal and/or destruction of dress tasks concerning IEDs. As a consequence, there is mounting
explosive ordnance.
consensus from the IMAS Review Board members to suggest that
• Reaffirmation of humanitarian, rather than military, in light of the current political debates and operational demands
objectives.
there is a need to:
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Figure 3. Improvised devices cleared in Iraq by MAG between July 2016
and August 2017 (IMP – Improvised; RC – Radio Controlled; CO – Command
Operated).

Figure 4. Improvised devices cleared in Syria by MAG between July 2016
and August 2017 (IMP – Improvised; RC – Radio Controlled; CO – Command
Operated).

Figure courtesy of MAG and GICHD.

Figure courtesy of MAG and GICHD.

•

State more clearly and up front in the IMAS the applicability
of the IMAS concerning IEDs. Hence an amendment is needed to IMAS 01.10, Guide for the application of International
Mine Action (IMAS).
• Clarify selected terminology (IMAS 04.10, Glossary of mine
action terms, definitions and abbreviations) due to inconsistencies with other key sources of terminology (e.g., the major
disarmament/arms control conventions, and the UNMAS
IED Lexicon).
• Add elements of technical guidance that will assist national
authorities and operators to ensure the safety and effectiveness of work.
Other areas being considered and supported by GICHD
include:
• A greater emphasis on risk assessments and risk management
frameworks.
• A strengthening of competency levels, equipment, and training requirements.
• Further guidance within the IMAS or Technical Notes on
Mine Action (TNMA) addressing mine action in an urban
environment, especially survey and information management considerations.
It is important to recall, however, that the IMAS remain a global framework and should not dwell on specific and local contexts.
There is ample opportunity in the development of NMAS to adapt
international standards concerning IEDs to national contexts.

Summary
The IMAS have an established architecture developed over two
decades of work that has legitimacy and standing. They have been
developed for the mine action sector for operations performed in
pursuit of humanitarian objectives and in accordance with humanitarian principles, and represent the set of standards used to
promote and maintain quality during the implementation of mine
action activities.
Mine action operations are not defined by weapon type but by
the objectives they pursue and the context in which they take place.
The IMAS therefore provide the overall framework to address all
explosive ordnance, including IEDs within the boundaries of humanitarian action.
The suitability of a mine action operator to engage at a particular location or with a specific explosive device is based,
first, on the operator being clear on the humanitarian objective

Mine action operations are not defined by
weapon type, but by the objectives they pursue
and the context in which they take place.
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of the undertaking, and on it having access to humanitarian
space and, second, on the operator possessing staff with necessary skills and equipment to perform the task.
Although hundreds of thousands of IEDs, including locallymanufactured landmines, have been cleared during mine action
operations within the framework of the IMAS, the standards are in
need of being strengthened in a number of areas. These include risk
management, competency levels, training and equipment requirements, and amendments to IMAS 01.10 and IMAS 04.10 to clarify
their application to improvised devices and to address inconsistencies in the glossary of definitions. Further technical guidance including operations in an urban environment should be included in
the IMAS or a supporting TNMA.
Matters relating to IEDD operations in military and security
contexts should be elaborated outside the IMAS—whether
procedures to counter IED attacks particularly concerning vehicleor person-borne IEDs, or aspects of forensics or intelligence that
could be used to bring perpetrators to justice. All of these are
incompatible with humanitarian action and principles and do not
have space in the scope and remit of the IMAS.
There is a priority, however, to protect the integrity of the IMAS
to address all relevant explosive ordnance, including IEDs, as the
primary framework to manage operations that are humanitarian in
nature.16

See endnotes page 66
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